Many arrive at suffering-focused ethics (SFE) through a consequentialist lens, reflecting on how actions produce better or worse outcomes. From this perspective, one might recognize that suffering possesses a uniquely negative moral weight—a kind of disvalue that other states, including happiness, cannot counterbalance. Yet this is only one path to the view that reducing suffering should take moral priority. Many other plausible, and popular, moral frameworks converge on this priority. (This essay draws on Chapter 6 of Suffering-Focused Ethics.)
The Golden Rule
The Golden Rule—“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”—is often described as the most elemental and universal moral principle ever expressed. Found in the teachings of Confucius, Jesus, and the Buddha, it encodes a simple moral symmetry. When applied to suffering, this symmetry takes on its most profound meaning. Imagining ourselves in the grip of intense pain—agonized, trapped, or despairing—we would strongly want others to set aside almost everything else and help us escape. To live by the Golden Rule, then, is to recognize that others’ suffering demands the same moral urgency as our own.
The Categorical Imperative
A related but more formal principle is Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative, which commands that we act only on principles we could rationally will to be universal laws. Like the Golden Rule, it calls for an impartial standpoint that rises above personal preference. Plausibly, someone who consistently prioritized other ends—such as personal projects—over helping those in distress could not coherently will a world in which everyone behaved the same way, since they themselves would then be without help when suffering. Kant concluded that such a principle fails the test of universality and therefore cannot be morally justified (see 4:423 of Kant’s Groundwork).
Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism
Egalitarianism holds that we should work to reduce unjust inequality. Prioritarianism holds that benefits to those who are worse off carry greater moral weight than equal benefits to those who are better off. These views can define “worse off” in various ways—through wealth, opportunity, freedom, or health, for instance—but it seems reasonable to think that a person’s inner life or experience should play an important role in these assessments. After all, what good are material and social advantages if they leave you miserable?
If we grant that inner experience is morally relevant, both egalitarianism and prioritarianism naturally lend support to the view that we should prioritize reducing suffering. Doing so promotes greater equality without “leveling down” or harming those who are better off. It also focuses our moral concern on those who are worst off in a clearly significant way.
Egalitarian and prioritarian intuitions may lend support to Derek Parfit’s “claim about compensation,” which holds that “someone’s burden cannot be compensated by benefits to someone else.” On this view, we may not purchase positive goods for some at the expense of others’ suffering. Hence, we ought to prioritize reducing suffering.
Justice as Fairness
John Rawls, in his influential theory of justice as fairness, asks us to imagine choosing the principles that govern society from behind a veil of ignorance—a position in which we know nothing about our future status, talents, or circumstances. From this impartial standpoint, Rawls argues, rational individuals would design a society that safeguards basic liberties and gives priority to improving the position of the worst off.
Again, it seems plausible to think of “worst off” largely in terms of the inner experience of sentient beings. Behind the veil, we cannot rule out being born into a life marked by severe suffering. If Rawls is right, it seems that rational deliberators would give strong priority to reducing suffering—especially the worst forms of it. They would be motivated by the thought that they themselves could be in a position to experience this suffering.
Contractualism
According to contractualism as developed by T.M. Scanlon, we may only act on principles that all rational individuals could accept as the basis for mutual respect and cooperation. From this standpoint, the moral weight of suffering quickly becomes clear. Could anyone reasonably accept a principle under which they would endure extreme, avoidable suffering for the sake of others’ benefits?
Scanlon’s answer is no, at least for many such cases. His Transmitter Room thought experiment makes the point vivid: imagine one person trapped in agony in the transmitter room of a TV broadcast. The show is the World Cup, and millions are watching. Though the pleasure of those millions is genuine, it cannot justify one person’s torment. The sufferer, according to Scanlon, has grounds to reject the principle that permits his torment for continuing the broadcast.
Plausibly, this reasoning extends beyond the short-term pleasure of entertainment to more lasting pleasure or happiness. No more, perhaps, could we invoke the sublime joys of Omelas to justify the torture of a child.
Rights and Duties
Rights-based ethics offer yet another route to the conclusion that reducing suffering deserves moral priority. Such views hold that morality demands respecting the rights of individuals—moral boundaries that protect each person’s inviolable status.
One compelling example of this view is Seana Shiffrin’s principle against nonconsensual harm, which defends a moral right not to be harmed without one’s consent, except when such harm is necessary to prevent a greater one.
Protection from severe, nonconsensual harm has long been treated as one of the most fundamental human rights. It is enshrined in international law as an absolute right. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, affirms that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person,” and that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
Beyond negative rights that protect us from impositions of harm, we might also recognize important positive rights—rights to be helped in some way. A right to be spared from severe suffering would seem to be among the strongest candidates for a positive right.
Other moral theories, such as W.D. Ross’s pluralist deontology, focus on duties we have to others. The duty of non-maleficence—roughly, “do not harm”— is widely endorsed. Yet so is the duty of beneficence, which demands that we actively help others. Plausibly, both principles have their clearest application in the face of suffering, demanding that we not cause suffering to others and that we actively help others avoid it.
Compassion and Other Virtues
A different route to the same conclusion runs through virtue ethics and compassion. Thinkers from Schopenhauer and Hume to Bertrand Russell have emphasized compassion or sympathy as a central moral impulse. Compassion directs moral attention toward suffering with immediacy and clarity, highlighting the urgency of alleviating others’ distress over many other concerns.
Religious and philosophical traditions echo the importance of compassion in various forms. The Hippocratic Oath, Buddhist ahimsa, and the Christian commandment to love your neighbour reflect the insight that refusing to cause or tolerate suffering is the heart of moral decency. Albert Schweitzer’s ethic of reverence for life extends this goodwill to all sentient beings, describing us as part of a shared “community of suffering.” For Schweitzer, to recognize this shared vulnerability is to see ethics as an expression of solidarity across species and experience.
Conclusion
One need not be a consequentialist to conclude that we should prioritize reducing suffering. Many of the most plausible and enduring moral theories converge on this idea. They reach it by different routes, yet the overlap is striking. This suggests we are triangulating toward a sound conclusion glimpsed from many directions. If we remain uncertain about which moral theory is ultimately correct or most plausible, it seems reasonable to act on aims that are robust across many frameworks. By that standard, few aims are as well supported as reducing suffering.