This post is a reply to Johan Gustafsson’s draft paper “Against Negative Utilitarianism”. Gustafsson acknowledges that for many common objections raised against negative utilitarianism (NU), there are corresponding objections that can be raised against classical utilitarianism (CU) (see e.g. Knutsson, 2021a). Hence, as he writes, “these objections have little force when we assess the relative merits of Classical and Negative Utilitarianism” (Gustafsson, 2022, p. 1).
The aim of Gustafsson’s paper is to present novel counterexamples against NU that have no analogues in the case of CU. My aim in this post is to show that CU does face such analogous counterexamples, and that these counterexamples are worse than those facing NU. I also argue that views that give overriding importance to the reduction of extreme suffering seem uniquely plausible in light of the counterexamples reviewed here. [...]