by Magnus Vinding. First published in August 2022.
Various views deny that suffering has a positive counterpart. Proponents of such views often pursue a line of argument that focuses on the prevalence of subtle frustrations and bothersome sensations. That is, when we typically think that we are in a neutral state, and we claim that some pleasure takes us above that neutral state, what we are experiencing is really a subtly bothered and unsatisfied state that becomes (somewhat) relieved of its commonly overlooked unpleasant features (see e.g. Sherman, 2017, pp. 103-107; Gloor, 2017, sec. 2.1; Knutsson, 2022, sec. 5).
This essay will pursue a different line of argument. Rather than focusing on unpleasant states, and arguing for their subtle omnipresence, my aim here is instead to zoom in on the purportedly positive side. I will argue that purportedly positive experiences do not possess any property that renders them genuine opposites of painful and uncomfortable experiences, neither in phenomenological nor axiological terms.
Candidates of positive experiences
I will start by listing a variety of experiential states that are often claimed to be positive. This list is by no means exhaustive, but it still helps to make the discussion that follows more concrete and precise.
Common candidates of positive experiences include feelings of:
Excitement, gratitude, optimism, motivation, contentment, inspiration, enthusiasm, pride, ecstasy, amusement, elation, orgasm, euphoria, lust, hope, cheerfulness, awe, confidence, joy, passion, love, social recognition, social connection, being desired, and being successful.1
With this list in place, we can avoid certain pitfalls and misunderstandings. For example, if someone asserts that positive experiences do not exist, many people may intuitively interpret that to mean that experiential states such as excitement and gratitude do not exist. This seems like a trivially false claim, and hence the stated claim about the non-existence of positive experiences is apt to be dismissed.
So to be clear, I am not claiming that the feelings listed above do not exist. What I am claiming, rather, is that none of these feelings or experiential states are phenomenological opposites to suffering and discomfort.
In other words, my core claim is that there is nothing about the phenomenological nature of these states that render them a positive counterpart to suffering (beyond the extent to which they are absent of suffering). And since these states are not phenomenological opposites to suffering, they are plausibly not axiological opposites to it either. That is, we should not consider states such as those listed above to be axiological opposites to suffering any more than we should consider, say, experiences of color or sound to be axiological opposites, or counterparts, to suffering.
Unpacking the phenomenological claim that I deny
Intuitively, it might seem like I am making a strong claim. Yet I would argue that it is actually the claim that I am denying that is the stronger one, and I believe this becomes apparent once we carefully unpack the exact nature of that claim.
To say that certain experiences represent a positive counterpart to suffering is not merely to say that the experiences in question are absent of suffering. Instead, the claim is essentially that experiences of suffering fall along one axis of experience, while (purported) positive experiences fall along another axis, where these two axes are anti-directional relative to some neutral point or state space. Suffering has a phenomenological counterpart that in some sense amounts to anti-suffering.
When specified in these more precise terms, it is at least not obvious that the existence of such a phenomenological counterpart to suffering is more plausible than is its non-existence. And as we shall see in the next section, there are indeed good reasons to doubt the existence of such a positive counterpart.
Arguments against a phenomenological counterpart to suffering
A priori reasons to doubt phenomenological dual opposites
We arguably have no a priori reason to think that suffering has a positive counterpart in the way described above. More than that, one could even argue that we have a priori reasons to doubt the dual-axis picture outlined in the previous section. After all, a view of phenomenology that insists on the existence of such an anti-directional double axis of experience seems considerably less simple and less parsimonious than does a view that entails no oppositely directed dimensions of experience.
More generally, one may argue that it is doubtful whether experiential states even can have phenomenological opposites. Does this notion even make sense?
For instance, does the experience of the color red have an opposite experience? What could this mean? Perhaps the most plausible candidate pair of phenomenological opposites in the realm of phenomenal color is black and white. Yet even here it is far from obvious whether we have identified an example of phenomenological opposites, rather than states that exhibit a high degree of phenomenological contrast. The same could be said about experiential states that involve loud sounds versus states that involve silence. There is stark contrast, and there is the presence and absence of different properties, but it is doubtful whether there are genuine anti-properties in any meaningful sense (a similar point is made in Heathwood, 2007, p. 27).
Continuing the analogy to phenomenal sound, one could argue that phenomenological anti-suffering makes no more sense than does phenomenological “anti-noise”. That is, just as an experience cannot get more silent than absolute silence, an experience cannot be more opposite or anti-directional to suffering than when it is wholly absent of suffering or discomfort.2
In general, it seems unclear what it would be like for two different experiential states to be phenomenological dual opposites, and it is likewise unclear whether this notion of phenomenological opposites even makes sense in the first place.
Introspection
In my view, the strongest argument against the existence of a phenomenological counterpart to suffering is that introspection yields no sign of such a counterpart. When we introspectively examine the proposed candidates of positive experiences, such as those listed above, we do not find that they have any phenomenological properties that render them the dual opposites of suffering, or anti-suffering, as it were.
In other words, even if we grant that the notion of phenomenological dual opposites is a coherent one (despite the doubts raised in the previous section), and if we set out to search for the phenomenological dual opposites of suffering via introspective examination, the conclusion, I submit, is that they do not exist.
I do not expect anyone to accept this claim on authority. I encourage readers to pursue this introspective exercise themselves: to search for the phenomenological property (or properties) that would render an experience the dual opposite of suffering. (It is my impression that such a phenomenological property is often tacitly assumed but rarely seriously looked for or scrutinized.)
Note that I am not claiming that the purportedly positive experiences listed above have no properties in common (I take no position on that issue here). Nor am I saying that the experiences listed above cannot be intense or even all-consuming.
One might object that different experiential states are opposites in terms of the respective behaviors that they tend to elicit — e.g. some experiences may motivate us to approach ripe berries while other experiences may motivate us to avoid moldy ones. But even if we grant that different experiences can in some sense motivate opposite behaviors, this still does not imply that the experiential states in question are dual opposites in phenomenological terms. After all, the experience of wanting and savoring something does not seem to be the dual opposite of the experience of not wanting and actively disliking something else.
Indeed, one could argue that the experiences that motivate us to approach certain things, as well as the experiences that motivate us to avoid certain (other) things, are all ultimately driving us through the force of frustrated desires and unpleasant states. On this view, even drives to attain desired experiences (e.g. sexual and gustatory ones) are ultimately animated by the frustrations and bothersome states that we experience when our desires for these states are not fulfilled (cf. Sherman, 2017, pp. 60-61; Knutsson, 2019; Vinding, 2022, sec. 23).
Likewise, it seems that one can reconceptualize the “approach versus avoidance” framework in comparative terms that dissolve the apparent oppositeness. To take the example of berries, one can think of it in terms of preferences for (experiences of) ripe berries over mild hunger, mild hunger over slightly moldy berries, slightly moldy berries over intense hunger, etc. These latter examples reveal that whether we approach or avoid something is not an absolute matter, but rather dependent on our alternative choices. And in line with the argument made above, one could argue that the motivating force of our experiential states is ultimately best understood in such comparative terms, where we generally seek to attain states that are less bothered or which have fewer unmet needs (cf. Sherman, 2017, p. 106).3
Evidence from psychology and neuroscience
Lastly, there is evidence from psychology and neuroscience that casts doubt on the notion that pain and suffering are opposites of pleasure and other purportedly positive experiences. Evidence from neuroscience is less relevant than the introspective evidence, since the claim that we are concerned with is a phenomenological one, and neuroscience is not directly about phenomenological claims. Yet evidence from neuroscience can plausibly still help inform our views on phenomenology and on the nature of suffering and its purported dual opposites.
Baumeister et al. write the following in a review article (2001, p. 331): “Although laypersons typically regard [pleasant and unpleasant emotions] as opposites, there is some evidence that the two are somewhat independent …”
Likewise, philosopher of psychology and neuroscience Adam Shriver summarizes the evidence in the following way (2014b, abstract):
Recent results from the neurosciences demonstrate that pleasure and pain are not two symmetrical poles of a single scale of experience but in fact two different types of experiences altogether, with dramatically different contributions to well-being.
(See also Shriver, 2014a; Bain & Brady, 2014; de Boer, 2014, p. 712.)
Why we might believe that a positive counterpart to suffering exists
If experiences such as those listed earlier are not a positive counterpart to suffering in phenomenological terms — as I argue they are not — it is natural to wonder why these experiences are often thought to be such a positive counterpart.
I am aware of two factors that may help explain this belief. One reason might be that we are used to thinking about various phenomena in terms of positive and negative real numbers, and hence we are quick to project such numbers onto our experiences, even if such a conceptual representation might not be supported by careful introspection or other lines of evidence.
Another potential explanation that has been proposed by various authors is that purportedly positive experiences often serve to reduce states of suffering and discomfort, and hence we might confuse this genuine reduction of unpleasant states — which in some sense is a case of anti-suffering — for being a positive experience that goes over and above states that are wholly absent of suffering and discomfort.
As Toby Sherman puts it, “pleasure can be remedial, not for particular pains, but for pain-in-general, which is why it often seems to be not remedial at all.” (Sherman, 2017, p. 8; see also sec. 11.2.)
Lukas Gloor has expressed a similar view (Gloor, 2017, sec. 2.1):
When our brain is flooded with pleasure, we temporarily become unaware of all the negative ingredients of our stream of consciousness, and they thus cease to exist. Pleasure is the typical way in which our minds experience temporary freedom from suffering, which may contribute to the view that happiness is the symmetrical counterpart to suffering, and that pleasure, at the expense of all other possible states, is intrinsically important and worth bringing about.
Indeed, one may argue that the two potential explanations reviewed above complement each other: we are accustomed to thinking in terms of real-valued pluses and minuses, and we apparently find introspective support for thinking about our experiences in these terms when we notice that some feelings (e.g. feelings of excitement and gratitude) move us away from the “minuses”, which suggests that they are genuine “pluses”. But what we miss, Sherman and Gloor might argue, is that these “pluses” only represent relative “pluses”, toward a smaller or non-existent “minus” (i.e. less suffering and discomfort). They do not take us to an absolute “plus” of phenomenological anti-suffering. (See also Knutsson, 2022, sec. 5.2.)
Axiological implications
As noted earlier, it seems natural to argue that if purportedly positive experiences do not represent a phenomenological counterpart to suffering, then they do not represent an axiological counterpart to suffering either.
An expanded axiological version of the phenomenological argument outlined above lends further support to this view. That is, just as there is nothing about purportedly positive experiences that suggests that they are phenomenological opposites to suffering (in the strong anti-directional sense specified above), nor is there, I submit, anything else about those experiences that suggests that they can outweigh experiences of suffering.
Again, I would encourage readers to introspect and search for any such phenomenological property that would suggest that an experience can axiologically outweigh experiences of suffering.
Of course, references to phenomenological properties are not the only way in which one could attempt to defend the view that purportedly positive experiences can outweigh states of suffering. Yet arguments that rely on phenomenological properties are perhaps among the most obvious arguments that could be made in its favor, and it seems that if we were to establish that there is no phenomenological support for the claim that purportedly positive experiences can outweigh suffering (as I argue there is not), then this would be a significant blow to that claim about outweighing.
Objection: This argument cuts both ways
Perhaps the main objection to my argument is that it cuts both ways: if purportedly positive experiences are not the phenomenological opposite of suffering, then neither is suffering the phenomenological opposite of purportedly positive experiences. So the axiological argument could also be made in the other direction: we have no phenomenological reason to think that suffering can outweigh purportedly positive experiences, and why should we start from the axiological assumption that suffering is worth preventing rather than assuming that purportedly positive experiences are worth creating?
I agree with the first part of this objection: suffering is indeed not the phenomenological opposite of purportedly positive experiences (“is not the opposite of” is clearly a symmetric relation). However, I think there are various arguments that support the axiological starting point that suffering is worth preventing over the starting point that purportedly positive experiences are worth creating.
One such argument is a basic asymmetry between the presence of suffering and the absence of purportedly positive experiences, and a consequent asymmetry between the non-prevention and non-creation of these respective states. That is, the presence of suffering amounts to a problematic state, and hence so does the failure to prevent suffering, whereas the absence of purportedly positive experiences does not amount to a problematic state, and hence neither does its non-creation. The presence of suffering is more plausibly a state worth rectifying than is the absence of purportedly positive experiences, and the absence of purportedly positive experiences is arguably not in any way suboptimal in axiological terms.
Another argument for the same conclusion is that there is a phenomenological asymmetry in the plausibility of these respective claims. In phenomenological terms, experiences of suffering and discomfort feel like they have intrinsic disvalue — or at least they have phenomenal qualities that render it plausible to assign them such disvalue — but purportedly positive experiences do not, on closer inspection, feel like they have intrinsic positive value, or like it is plausible to assign them such value (see e.g. Knutsson, 2021, sec. 3; Knutsson, 2022).
Moreover, even if one thinks that purportedly positive experiences feel like they have some intrinsic value, it still seems plausible that states of suffering have phenomenal features that make them disvaluable in a qualitatively different and overriding way, such that they are not plausibly outweighed by the alleged intrinsic value of purportedly positive experiences (Vinding, 2020, sec. 1.4).
In particular, one could argue that suffering introspectively carries a felt “urgency of change” while purportedly positive experiences do not (cf. Metzinger, 2017, p. 254). And to the extent that purportedly positive experiences do contain such an urgency, one may argue that they are in fact bothersome and suboptimal experiences (Gloor, 2017, sec. 2.2; Knutsson, 2019).
(Additional arguments in favor of a strong axiological asymmetry between suffering and purportedly positive experiences are found in Vinding, 2020, Part I; Ajantaival, 2021/2022.)
Purportedly positive experiences can still be instrumentally positive
An important qualification is that the non-existence of intrinsically positive experiences does not imply the non-existence of instrumentally positive experiences. (By “positive experiences”, I here specifically mean “suffering-outweighing experiences”.)
For instance, states of excitement and gratitude may still have “net positive” value to the extent that they help prevent suffering, such as by relieving suffering in the experiencer or by motivating future actions that reduce suffering. These experiences can thus still be worth actively cultivating and investing in, even if it is ultimately for instrumental reasons. Much like knowledge, they can serve as an important resource for creating a better world.
Concluding reflections on my argument
An alternative view to the one I have defended here is that there exist positive experiences that are phenomenological opposites to suffering, but that those positive experiences do not have corresponding positive value. I suspect that this is the view that many people will think of when they hear a claim such as “positive experiential value does not exist”. And that view may seem inconsistent and ad hoc. After all, if we assign negative value to negative experiences, why should we not assign positive value to oppositely directed positive experiences?
What I have tried to argue in this essay is that that view rests on an erroneous foundation. There are no oppositely directed positive experiences in phenomenological terms to begin with (i.e. no phenomenological anti-suffering), and hence there is nothing inconsistent or ad hoc about not assigning corresponding positive intrinsic value to any experiences.
The view I have charted here does not deny the existence of excitement, amusement, awe, etc.; it does not deny the instrumental utility of those states; and it does not posit any ad hoc break between the phenomenological and the axiological level. These features seem worth highlighting, as it appears that a strong axiological asymmetry between suffering and purportedly positive experiences is often deemed implausible precisely because it is thought to entail those non sequiturs.
Acknowledgments
For their helpful comments, I thank Tobias Baumann, Anthony DiGiovanni, Simon Knutsson, and Winston Oswald-Drummond.
References
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