In this series of six essays, CRS Researcher Teo Ajantaival explores minimalist views of wellbeing, value, and ethics (i.e. views that essentially say “the less this, the better”).
He also looks at reasons to be careful about the practical implications of abstract formalisms.
The essays of this series build on each other, but can also be read independently. The first essay was published in 2021 and the series completed in November 2023.
Positive roles of life and experience in suffering-focused ethics
This first essay explores a common objection to suffering-focused ethics – that it contradicts our practically prioritizing other pursuits, such as seeking positive experiences.
To respond, the essay aims to show that even if we assume a purely suffering-focused view, it would still be wise to recognize the highly positive and often necessary roles that other things may have for reducing suffering.
Minimalist axiologies and positive lives
Minimalist axiologies, or theories of value, are views whose central conception of independent value says “The less this, the better.”
This essay looks at minimalist axiologies that are impartial and welfarist (i.e. concerned with the welfare of all sentient beings), with a focus on their theoretical and practical implications.
Peacefulness, nonviolence, and experientialist minimalism
The third essay on minimalist axiologies is a response to potential worries about cessation, which are often raised as objections to experience-focused and purely consequentialist versions of minimalist views.
It shows that cessation implications are not unique to minimalist views, argues that other consequentialist views have worse theoretical implications, and argues that minimalist consequentialists have strong practical reasons to pursue a nonviolent approach and to cooperate with people who hold different values.
Minimalist extended very repugnant conclusions are the least repugnant
Population axiology matters greatly for our priorities. Recently, it has been claimed that all plausible axiological views imply certain “very repugnant conclusions”.
This response argues that minimalist views avoid these “very repugnant conclusions”, and that they face less repugnant conclusions than contrasting offsetting views do.
Minimalist views of wellbeing
The fifth essay in the series discusses the variety of minimalist alternatives to “good minus bad” views of wellbeing.
Varieties of minimalist moral views: Against absurd acts
The final essay of the minimalist axiologies series addresses criticisms that minimalist moral views – which prioritize reducing negatives like suffering – might lead to the endorsement of absurd acts like violence or neglecting to save lives.
The essay aims to demonstrate that the most plausible and well-construed interpretations of minimalist views do not support such actions.
Teo now intends to write a book based on this series. Please feel free to leave comments on the essays, or to contact us if you have any feedback or would like to discuss the series with Teo.